Media representations of war and conflict

Nico Carpentier
## and George Terzis (eds.)

Brussels – 2005

Introduction

Media play a crucial role in representing conflicts. Especially when media systems are located in states-at-war, or find themselves in (geographical or cultural) proximity of these states, the media's traditional claims towards objectivity, factuality and truth-speaking have to face severe pressures. Often, they and their audiences are left with a feeling of powerlessness. Every recent, highly meditated war has generated the same impenetrable vicious cycle of enthusiasm and fascination, frustration, remorse and excuses, followed by the formulation of new good intentions for the next war or conflict.

This workshop had the ambition to bring together European scholars and a small group of Belgian journalists. This joining of intellectual forces led to a series of interesting presentations and discussions on how to break through this vicious cycle. The main objective of this workshop was to create a dialogue between academics and media professionals, which would facilitate mutual learning and which would start a process of reflection on media theories and practices in relation to war, aimed at improving the future representations of war and conflict.

We want to thank all participants for coming to this workshop and for contributing to the presentations and discussions. We also want to thank Marleen Meyvis (KUB), Andries Fluit (KUB) and Asya Vitanova (Vesalius College) for their help in making this workshop a successful event.

Nico Carpentier & George Terzis

Workshop program

March 18, 2005 @ the KUBrussel

1245: welcome and introduction

13-14: presentations on war and content
- Nico Carpentier: dealing with objectivity
- Rune Ottosen: peace journalism as a counter strategy
- Mireille Thornton: improving war reportage: arguing for the audience

1430-15: break

15-16: presentations on structural impediments and proposed changes
- Jake Lynch: A reliable account of what is really going on? The UK media and the war on Iraq
- George Terzis: media determinants of positive and negative spirals of communication during times of war
- Jean-Paul Marthoz: media and war: the NSC effect versus the CNN effect
- Eran Fraenkel: inter-ethnic media interventions and war in Macedonia

16-1615: break

1615-18: discussion with Flip Voets, Ides Debruyne & Evita Neefs

Nico Carpentier:

I would like to start with the introduction and welcome. To everybody present here: I would like to thank you for coming from in some cases quite a long distance. It is appreciated that you made it to come to this (closed) workshop on 'Media representations of war and conflict'. The structure of the workshop is that we will have a first set of presentations on 'War and Content'; then we will have a break and followed by a second series of presentations. This second series of four presentations deals with what is called 'Structural impediments and proposed changes'. Afterwards, we'll have another break and then we would like to see a discussion take place. Each presentation will take about 15 minutes, which is really short as most of our speakers are accustomed to be in a more luxurious position. If you have questions we would like to ask you the keep the important questions for the discussion, unless you do want something to be clarified.

I would like to suggest that we briefly introduce ourselves. My name is Nico Carpentier, assistant professor at both the Catholic University of Brussels (KUB) and the Free University of Brussels (VUB). Most of my work is on media and democracy. I work in media studies and more specifically in television studies, although I do get outside the 'tv box' as well. But media and democracy is the angle I would like to take on this occasion. I also will be the first presenter.

Mireille Thornton:

My name is Mireille Thornton. I am working at the London School of Economics in the department of International Relations. I came to look at the news and media basically through studying international relations and conflict resolution. There is an absence of discussion about news media and there definitely are quite a lot of assumptions and audience perceptions about news media. That is what I am curious about and what I am going to talk about today. It is work-in-process and theoretical; I am still working on it so I am interested in your responses.

Jean-Paul Marthoz:

My name is Jean-Paul Marthoz. I am the international director of Human rights Watch. My interest is situated in journalism, human rights crises and also terrorism.

Ides Debruyne:

My name is Ides Debruyne. I am working for the Pascal Decroos Foundation (FDC). We have been giving grants to journalists who are interested in doing something more than only reporting. We try to stimulate the development of journalism in Flanders. I am also member of the board of the VVOJ, an organization for investigative journalists that is organizing in September a 4 days conference in Amsterdam on investigative journalism.

Flip Voets:

My name is Flip Voets. I'm a former journalist. For the moment I am the secretary of the Flemish Press Council. We are an institution for self-regulation of the media, we deal mainly with complaints, which we first try to settle, and if there is no conflict settlement possible the council makes a decision about the complaint. We deal mainly with the ethics of the media.

Jake Lynch:

My name is Jake Lynch and I teach courses at Sydney University, University of Queensland and the Harvard University in the UK. I have organized series of workshops bringing together journalists and others. My interest which I am going to speak about today is peace journalism and what it can mean as a fund of insight and analysis and practical observations for working journalists.

Asya Vitanova:

I'm Asya Vitanova, a master's student at Vesalius collega, and I'm responsible for the transcription.

George Terzis:

My name is George Terzis. I teach at Vesalius College, which operates in association with the Free University of Brussels (VUB). I teach communication studies and journalism. My main research interest is media practices during times of war. I used to work as a journalist. For the last three years of my journalistic career I was the EU and NATO correspondent for the Greek State Radio.

Eran Fraenkel:

My name is Eran Fraenkel. I work for Search for Common Ground. I am not a journalist but I do a lot of work with the media and use

the media for social transformation. I'm leaning more to the applied side of some of those ideas. I work with various media—print and electronic media — in South Eastern Europe. In my presentation on Media and War I will focus mostly on the conflicts in Kosovo in 1999.

Evita Neefs:

My name is Evita Neefs. I work at the Foreign Desk of De Standaard, which is a Dutch language newspaper here in Brussels. In everyday journalistic life we have a little time to reflect on the theory so I think what you have to say will be very interesting to me.

Rune Ottosen:

My name is Rune Ottosen. I am professor in journalism at Oslo University College in Norway. I teach journalism and I have also been involved in research on the issue of war coverage in Norwegian media for many years. I have also been involved in discussions on War and peace journalism in different workshops. And I am also the responsible for a module in peace journalism within a Master Course in Global Journalism, which is a joint Nordic event.

Nico Carpentier:

Thank you very much. The first part (as already mentioned) deals with presentations on 'war and content'. I will be the first speaker in the series, followed by Rune and Mireille. What I would like to very quickly introduce is the importance of the dichotomies, binaries and oppositions in war reporting and war coverage and the importance of what I would like to call 'Creating an Enemy'- discourses on the enemy and on the self. One claim that I would like to make here is that if you look at the war coverage, there is, sometimes in different degrees, an ideological framework of war present. My claim is that that ideological framework is actually structured by a series of discourses, which in turn are built on dichotomies.

These dichotomies are: good/evil, just/unjust, innocent/guilty, rational/irrational, civilized/barbaric, organized/chaotic, superior towards technology/part of technology, human/animal-machine, united/fragmented, heroic/cowardice & determined/insecure and more. A lot of the coverage is actually based on those binaries. Now the binaries not only define the enemy as being for instance irrational, unjust, barbaric, but at the same time (which is part of a theoretical elaboration which I am not going to get myself stuck into now) that opposition allows us to define ourselves or the parties involved as the 'good' side. Each of these discourses is not just on

the enemy but also at the same time implicitly on the self. If we are fighting an unjust enemy we become just, if we are fighting an uncivilized and barbaric enemy we become civilized. If we are trying to punish the guilty party, we try to save the innocent victim. Looking at media and their role in dealing with these ideological models, they of course become part of not just distributing the model but also in producing these discourses themselves.

One of the traditional problems is that journalists are often seen as outside of those dominant discourses. As being on the sideline of the societal playing field, observing the things that are happening and not being part of it, the keyword is of course detachment, which you will find in journalistic discourses quite often. I would like to problematize that part, as journalists cannot be detached from those discourses. They are embedded within these discourses and they have a specific relationship with that ideological model of war. At the same time they face a lot of practical problems because of the way they are organized. When talking about those practical problems, I would like to focus on the notion of objectivity and how these routine practices related to objectivity actually create a series of problems and in some cases strengthen the ideological model of war. My case study comes from what I would like to call 'The Third Golf War'. It deals with television and the North Belgian main news broadcasts on television for the period of the war in a strict sense (March/April 2003) in Iraq. Most of my examples will come from one specific news broadcast which was broadcast on April 7, 2003 by the VRT, the North Belgian public broadcasting company.


Figure 1: Items on war in Belgian news broadcasts – based on ENA-data

First I would like to give you a quick overview of the war coverage on television both on the commercial and public news broadcasts. When looking at the amount of time that was attributed to the war in comparison to all the other topics that were handled during this period, you can actually see that there are three phases in the coverage. The first phase is the start of the war, where the 'war share' exceeds 60-70%. During the first days we actually had 100% coverage on war, there was no time spent on items other than the war. This quite rapidly decreased and at the end of March (phase 2) it actually reached the minimum, around 20%. But when the battle for Baghdad started we have another sort of platform, you see that there is again an increase in attention being spend (phase 3).

If you look at the discourses and dichotomies in the war coverage, we can see that the American soldiers are quite often portrayed as masculine, heroic and in full control of the situation. Moreover, the 'good' side is being welcomed. According to the British tank commander (interviewed in the April, 7 broadcast) for instance, the reception is really positive - 'the best we have seen so far'. The little kid is giving the thumbs up-sign saying to the passing tanks 'you are very welcome'. At the same time we see pictures of the creation of a Better and New Iraq, the arrival of Chalabi, the Shiite rituals becoming possible again. That of course links up to the notion of liberation. On the other hand, if you look at the 'bad' side of the story, the other side, the opposition; then we prominently see in the broadcast of April, 7 the palaces which are being conquered by the American and British troops in Baghdad and Basra. I have never seen this many bathrooms in palaces in a news broadcast. Key items of these shots are the tabs, which are of course golden tabs. They represent the corruptness of the Iraqi regime, which has been emphasized over and over again. At the same time you know how important the palaces were during the entire conflict and before the war as the people who were trying to gain access to the palaces before the actual conflict were banned from entering them. Seeing now American or British soldiers in there actually signifies defeat. That defeat at the same time does not mean that the enemy is harmless, the opposite is the case - they are being portrayed as extremely violent - one of the traditional images we see repeatedly is the chemical attack on Halabja. In short we see, when it comes to the self, the army and the regime heroically fighting, they are being extremely relaxed, self-assured - they are sometimes shown sleeping on the battlefield (you only sleep when you are winning a war, not when you are being defeated). Those soldiers are also shown to be helpful, whenever possible. They are for instance shown helping a little baby. At the same time they are again being portrayed as liberators. When it comes to technology and arms, the commercial news broadcast for instance showed an animation

'explaining' how a cruise missile was launched. Of course there is only one building in the animation, which carries the Iraqi flag. Of course it is being destroyed. The idea of the perfect technology not making any victims is embedded in animations like these. When we see enemy soldiers, we see them defeated and imprisoned. In other cases they are absently present; they are not there, no faces, they are not on the television, unless they are being captured. If they are captured they are seen as humans. Before they are completely dehumanized, they are part of military technology and at the same time threatening because of the possible use of chemical warfare illustrated by showing gas masks and body protecting equipment in the news broadcasts.

Looking at the specific articulations of balance – who do we see in those news broadcasts? – we can actually count the number of uniforms present in those news broadcasts. Spokespersons are lead sources with their war language and media management. Kofi Anan, in this one broadcast, is the only exception. George Hoon, the British Secretary of Defense, is somewhat an in-between. Who provides the context of the entire war? They are military experts providing us with of course military expertise and military context. We get to see a lot of the geographies of war (maps, satellite pictures etc.). We are exposed to a flow, an uninterrupted flow of war coverage, illustrated by the counting of the days - for example 'this is day 19 of the war, this city has fallen into the hands of the coalition troops'.

We also have specific articulations of truth. There are a lot of problems with actually getting the story right. In this example of the VRT news broadcast on April 7, a correspondent faithfully states that chemical weapons have been found, as a fact, which is I guess sort of a mistake [smiles] - providing us with incorrect information - including a reference to a number of barrels with chemicals that were found in a chemical factory.

At the same time the story is not that simple, there are different elements that deal with the binary in a different way, the resistance towards the binary ideological model such as including an interview with a taxi driver stating that the Americans and the British can liberate Iraq but that they cannot stay, or showing the victims, allowing them to speak about what happened. This graph provides you with an overview of the civil protest during that period. You can see the time spent on an item on civil protests against the war. We have about 20% coverage on the war protests, which is a lot. In many occasions we also see the victims - children being bombarded, being hurt, a father who has just lost his son is being interviewed.

Figure 2: Civil protest in Belgian news broadcasts – based on ENA-data

To conclude, in a lot of cases we see a balance between the military and political spoke persons, elite sources, the context provided by military experts and a narration on the course of war. All are related to the discourses of war and not to the discourses of peace. It leads to the decontextualization of the conflict in time of space and to a secondary emphasis on the human cost of war. My point is that we need to rethink the notion of objectivity in order to have journalists protect the universal values of peace, freedom and justice. We need to find balances not only between different spokespersons but also between arguments, which I call an argumentative equilibrium. We need to see the relevance of civil society actors and their experts and not only of military experts. We need more critical and structural information, which includes the horrors of war and the context of the war. We need a diversity of journalisms (plural) and not just one traditional form of journalism.

Rune Ottosen:

My talk is based on several research projects linked to our program 'Journalism in the new world order', a research project that I have been running with my Swedish colleague Stig A. Nohrstedt. It is a discourse-analytical approach to media coverage, aimed at analyzing the linkage between texts in the war coverage and the environment where the journalists work. It is based on interviews with journalists and audience reception studies in conflicts like The Gulf War in 1991, September 11, Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq I 2003. The basis for this presentation is a comparison of the media coverage in different countries. My biggest study on the issue was on the Gulf War in 1991, where we had a comparative study of

Germany, USA, Sweden and Norway and Finland. What we found in all these studies was a national agenda in the national media, following basically the security and political orientation of the given country; at least in the mainstream press. So for instance in comparing Sweden and Norway, Norway being a NATO member and Sweden being neutral, there is significant difference when it comes to framing and the use of sources: where Norway tends to use more American sources and framing which is in line with the US coverage.

I think that it is interesting to see how both the New York Times and the Washington Post on year after the War in Iraq started apologized to the readers for misleading them and then taking responsibility for being a part of the war preparation. I think that it is good that they acknowledge their responsibility, to see that they are not separate from politics and the military. Journalists are part of the security policy environment whether they like it or not. My idea is to challenge the uncritical approach to the official sources. Perhaps the media should take their responsibility and have a step aside and perhaps aggressively question whether war is really necessary when the government is proposing it. It is good to have some solid references that all journalists can agree upon. This is especially relevant with the Bush doctrine of pre-emptive war, the promotional US-style democracy, which is implemented military and which is accompanied by the newspeak of the US-administration. The word 'freedom' was counted 28 times in one of George W. Bush's speeches, but when you have words like peace or freedom, you have to look behind the rhetoric, also as a journalist. I suggest that journalists could rally around some documents. After the WWII a global agreement existed to create the UN to avoid new wars, resulting in UN declarations, such as the UN Declaration on Human Rights. No journalist would disagree that it is a journalist's duty to defend the freedom of speech or the freedom of expression, press freedom, those kind of values. I think that could be also included in basic human right issues, that all people should be treated equally regardless of political beliefs or social background, religion etc.

Then, why peace journalism? The phrasing peace journalism is not important, what is important is to acknowledge that as a journalist you are a part of this system and that you can promote war (consciously or unconsciously) if you are not aware of the environment you operate in. And then I pose a set of rhetorical questions: why should journalists not take conscious steps towards avoiding the escalation of conflicts and wars throughout their reporting, and why should that be controversial? I think that's an interesting thing to discuss that you have to be aware of your own language. We all know that a same phenomenon can be expressed in different ways: a soldier can be a liberator, hero, freedom fighter,

terrorist, killer, and murderer. That is also part of the vocabulary of the news coverage. With global television, 24-hour coverage, a part of the war is taking place in the media, in the media coverage of the war. The media and the military acknowledge that themselves. Journalists should see that they have a role, regardless what they think about it themselves. This also applies for terrorism: how could September 11 become such a global event without the media?

In modern military affairs we have PSYOPS as an integrated part of warfare, where you use media outlets, you use media like objects, not only leaflets directed to the soldiers but also the dropping of radios like for instance during the invasion in Afghanistan in November 2001. Media outlets become a part of the war itself. The US government is not hiding that they were using the media to try to persuade the public opinion on a global scale. The information warfare is there, you just have to be aware of it. In Norway, we are also subjected to propaganda stories like the Jessica Lynch story. One particular angle is Jason Blair, the New York Times journalist, who was fired because he fabricated stories. He was caught because he stole the story of Jessica Lynch from her local newspaper. He was fired and the New York Times had to apologize. I have not heard anybody apologizing for the big propaganda story about Jessica Lynch itself, which was created by the Pentagon as a propaganda story, full of lies, documented by the BBC documentary 'War Spin'. And also very worrying was the office of strategic influence created by Donald Rumsfeld. The New York Times of January 2002 revealed that they were allowed to lie in the global propaganda campaign. It was closed down when this was revealed but opened again according to the Los Angeles Times, and remained under central command. The New York Times mentioned that more than 20 federal agencies (including the State Department and the Pentagon) have created fake news clips and distributed them to the media, spending millions of dollars. A lot of media just accepted them and presented them as news stories. There was an editorial in the International Herald Tribune yesterday saying that this is a real challenge to journalism itself when these kinds of fabricated news items are distributed.

There is a historical pattern where the media-military relation followed this pattern of censorship, issues of access, issues of working conditions of journalists. It's described in the literature and the story tends to repeat itself in bigger variations. One issue is to be aware of that. And the structural framework around these wars is also based on key issues including the embedding system; should one take part in it or not? Principles of censorship; where is it reasonable to censor for military purposes? When is censorship really hiding propaganda? And also the language issue; the military

creates this kind of language that is supposed to make the war look more human. A study from the Gulf War of 1991 by the Guardian shows that war news doesn't talk about attacks, they call it sorties, you don't talk about killing, you talk about taking out and other things like that. I think that journalists have become more conscious about these issues, especially after the war in 1991. In Norway there were some very interesting discussions in the editorial rooms on what words should be used. There is more awareness about this. How to deal with this issue? Johann Galtung has created a model for War and peace journalism, which I think, is a prototype that could be used in this discussion. It has been used and developed by Jake and Annabel [McGoldrick] in their practical approach to journalism, which I'm sure Jake will talk about more. His scheme is much more comprehensible than what I show in this example but you can get a glimpse of the orientation.

I. Peace/conflict journalism:	II War/violence journalism
-Peace/conflict oriented (war as the problem)	-War/violence oriented ('them' as the problem)
-Truth-oriented: Expose untruths on all sides	-Propaganda-oriented: Expose 'their' untruths/ Help 'our' cover-ups/lies
-People-oriented: Focus on suffering all over-give voice to voiceless and name to evil doers on all sides	-Elite-oriented: Focus on 'our' suffering; on able-bodied elite males, give name to 'their' evil-doers
-Solution-oriented	-Victory-oriented

Figure 3: Johann Galtung's model for PJ & WJ

War journalism tends to be very dichotomized: you have one party that is going to win and another which is going to loose. You tend to expose untruths on the other side; you tend to use elite sources; you tend not to focus on civilian sufferings. It is victory-oriented - it's often like a sports game - and not solution-oriented. These kinds of schemes can be used to reflect on your own work. To take a recent example, if you take a look at the Russian media there is a typical dichotomy - Putin against Maskhadov. When the opposition leader is killed, does that imply Putin's victory and is the conflict then over? Obviously not. What is not reported in most media – Russian and Western media - is the structural issue surrounding the Chechen conflict. It is a very good example of where the lack of access and restrictions in the possibilities to report makes this kind of war going on without (or only occasionally) heading the news. A lot of Human Rights violations are going on without being reported. This creates a challenge. Andrei Bababitski, one of the few journalists who went to the Chechnya to reveal what is happening, also trying to inform the Russian audiences. His framing is that the war in itself is the problem and not just the enemy. Another

example is the fighting in Falluja around Christmas. US Today had a typical 'objective, balanced' approach, you had this good story about preparations of the elections in another city and some problems in Falluja, with something good happening and something bad happening, you know, life goes on, while the story about Falluja itself was not very detailed. The Guardian had a different approach. It was at that time impossible to go into the city because of the danger. They found an Iraqi doctor with a camera, who made a diary based on his own observations. This was a big city with 300.000 people, most of them evacuated. A lot of civilians died, no building was left untouched by the war, but this was basically outside the news agenda in most of our countries. The Guardian was claiming that the war is the problem, in all its gruesome details and the 'objective' story is really hiding what's going on. One irony is of course that the moment when the citizens of Falluja were allowed to return to the city was 2 days before the Tsunami, which really generated massive media coverage, creating a lot of empathy. Part of this is of course that there was no 'bad guy to blame'; it is part of the Nature. There, the media showed their ability to create empathy in a global context.

Remember the unarmed man in Falluja who was shot in front of the mosque. A photographer captured the shooting. But in this kind of war environment, it is difficult to get the story. Moreover, you get worthy and unworthy victims. In the preparations of the attacks on Falluja, the whole population of Falluja was demonized as being murderers. But Iraqi non-governmental organizations reported that all kinds of people were killed; 100.000 people killed of which the majority were civilians. Because of a lack to access and because of a lack of security these discrepancies are left unreported. Again, dichotomies play a crucial role. Before the war was Bush against Saddam Hussein, so now when Saddam is gone, has Bush won? Is there a real solution?

I would like to conclude with few words on the Norwegian war coverage. I've also made a study of both the Iraqi wars in the Norwegian media, and specifically about the coverage about the Norwegian military presence. Norway did not join the invasion and the occupation, but it committed itself to sending soldiers even before the UN resolution in May 2003. The Norwegian soldiers were part of it, some under the command of the British troops around Basra, some were part of the police. There are also commandos from Norway taking part in the war in Afghanistan. How were the military and their activities framed? In this example a Norwegian soldier is giving candy to children. The title is 'kind soldier under fire'. He is portrayed as a good-doer, but also in danger himself. This example is quite symbolic of the framing. Some more

problematic matters were raised by a professor of law in Oslo, claiming that all military activities, since Yugoslavia in 1991 (including Afghanistan in 2001), were illegal according to the Norwegian constitution, and also problematic according to international law. This could have been a possibility to raise some of the bigger issues, but it was basically not covered by the mainstream media at all. A small, left wing newspaper that was already against the war covered it. In that newspaper was an interesting legal discussion between this professor and the prosecutor responsible for this issue. But this took place in a really marginal paper, and not in the mainstream press.

Mireille Thornton:

I would like to say that what my work is still work in progress, so I am interested to hear your responses. I am also interested in ideas about improving war reportage and in putting the audience in this picture as well - the potential for more positive news media-related involvement in conflict resolution. I also want to raise, the question how *this* could aid the development of non-violent democratic communication processes and international political involvement within communities and global society.

Diana Francis, a life-long peace activist, considers the difficulties of publicly saying 'NO' to war. She writes that war is 'an integral part of an historic and pervasive system within which we are enmeshed ... we have always seen it as inevitable and recent events make it seem even more so'. To voice the question of whether a world without war is possible is to run straight into what one analyst has called the understated major premise of contemporary social science, which is the illusion of, and questions of the limitations on human freedom. We can ask what that freedom means, within news media cultures, towards explaining and creating an understanding of war and peaceful international relations.

We can refer here to the former Assistant Secretary General of the United Nations, Robert Muller, who is now a Chancellor at the University of Peace in Costa Rica. He recently said that never before in the history of the world has there been a global, visible, public, viable, open dialogue and conversation about the very legitimacy of war. News media will be central to making such conversation possible. Ignoring such a possibility is to assume that people are not interested in such a debate and to deny them democratic political possibilities. What I argue is compatible with an argument raised by John Keane, who has written a very interesting book called *Media and Democracy*. In it he says that the professional values of news media are as consistent with the values of peaceful

conflict resolution as the profit motive is with war. I would like to quote another writer as well, Roland Bleiker, who says that 'political reality' (if there can be such 'a' thing) 'comes into being only through the process of representation'.

What I want to do next is to just talk briefly about the idea of deconstructing the idea of news media representation. First, we can construct a deeper notion of news media representation of war, meaning that we are looking both into and beyond the text. One writer on representation, Stuart Hall, explains that representation is a very different notion from that of reflection. It implies the active work of selecting and presenting, of structuring and shaping. It is not about transmitting an already existing meaning, but of a more active labor of 'making things mean'. The idea is that news media can affect those very meanings that we have of war and conflict.

Secondly, I would break down the idea of news media representation into three facets. First of all we have to look at the narrative, the representational portrayal, and then we have to look at representation as a political representation or as 'advocacy'. And we also need to look at the self-representation within and beyond those texts, at the representation of the news media organizations. The first facet is about story-telling, framing, agenda-setting etc. but it is also important to see these facets as mutually constituted - you cannot really separate them. For example, I'm interested in how conceptions of audiences play out within news organizations and therefore in news reportage.

One answer that is often given is that people are 'not interested' in world politics and that they are simply 'too stupid' to understand the complexity of and connections within international relations. Obviously this is a useful construct but one that belies democracy and public interest claims. A key question for me here is how news media work to affect processes of political 'distancing'. What I call 'immediatizing' is about the *creation* of mediatized knowledge and about the way news media work to signify the possibility of purely objective knowledge. In other words, 'immediatizing' is about the processes of audiences' internalization of news media framing and arguments. Media arguments operate at different levels for every individual: being variously accepted, critically thought through and dismissed out of hand. So the issue is a complex one. It is clear that outside of the inevitably random aspect of individual experiences in the world, how we are individually and collectively involved in (or distanced from) war and peace is partly down to political choices that are made for and by us. But also news media reports and representations of conflicts are ultimately what audiences are able to make of them.

It is interesting to quote Umberto Eco here; he says that 'The battle for the survival of man as a responsible being in the Communications Era is not to be won where the communication originates, but where it arrives.' News media writers might imagine that their audience is positively engaged and interested in their connections to other people and to other's experiences of life. One example is when people buy mobile phones, laptops and other products without thinking about where the resources, coltan, cassiterite and so on, come from, about how buying them might perpetuate violent conflict. So when news media writers see audiences as interested rather than merely inward looking and presenting this as well as a two-fold move, presenting this with a full range of ideas about possible responses and policy options rather than reflecting only the political lead ideas or political consensus, people could access this debate openly and this could have a positive result towards transforming violent conflict. Audiences can be given information about political, economic, and social connections, processes of violent and non-violent change so they can then think about their actual abilities to respond to affect political change.

According to Richard Jackson Harris, a psychologist, news is the one area of media that people are most likely to uncritically accept as reflecting reality rather than constructing it. A particularly interesting idea of how news media representations work to construct reality is offered by John Hartley. He argues that journalism is primarily about the image of order, the imaginary ideal order, through the ideational process of 'photographic negativization'. Now this idea is that the construction of societal images of order comes about through media portrayals of the extreme opposite of that 'order', through elements of disorder. For example, 'outside' of war, everyone knows that murders happen; yet still they are highly unusual in our daily lives. News media report unusual events, elements of disorder, and put these against an idealized background of order: normality, rational and sane behavior. We could even say that the very regularities of news media production represent this structural order. It turns out that the less people have access to alternative sources of information and to education about politics, the more secure are both images: order and disorder. News reports on conflict are overwhelmingly focused on the violent phases and neglect the 'pre-' and 'post-violent' stages of war. News media also report on some conflicts to the neglect of others as Johann Galtung and many others have documented. Selective representation on this level is then squeezed even more thinly through the hierarchies of professionalized mainstream media.

News media represent in a specific recognizable and authoritative way. The question of who gets to speak within news media war narrative is important and typically audiences will hear self-imported white western apparently non-governmental organization workers and - more likely - official government and military representatives. It is a problem that when we hear of people living through war, when they're given the opportunity to express their experiences, it is usually as victims and very rarely as war refusers or as resisters of suffering. There is a brilliant article on this point, which is available on the Open Democracy website, by a Swiss journalist called Irena Brezna, 'Dreams of authenticity: War, TV and the Chechen mask'. She went to Chechnya and she very clearly demonstrates that people are refusing to be victims and their story is not being published because it would not fit the culturally acceptable frame, as an understanding of how people should be responding.

Within the academic discipline I am working in, international relations theory, there is an often used quotation: 'silences are the loudest voices' and this is used to demonstrate the urgent need to investigate the people and places absent from the misrepresented and marginalized within mainstream theories. I would argue that news media provide dangerously distorted images of both the world beyond our experience and our roles in it. This cramps our abilities to respond.

Finally I'd like to raise the discussion on two broad possibilities for improvements in news media representations of war. Both are linked to a fundamental aspect of war that is so vital to communicate further and to question the legitimacy of war.

Peace, or at least possibilities for peace, exist in war and also how war exists in times of peace. The dichotomy of war and peace can be broken down, arguing that basically all and everywhere could be represented as sites of conflict, which is very good news because it means that there are lots of stories out there. News audiences who perceive their lives as distant from war, as uninvolved, can be often reportaged in ways that demonstrates their and their societies connectedness both to distant wars and news media representations of human conflicts. So this is about Slavoj Žižek's idea that we have to see ourselves in news media pictures as well and put ourselves in the picture. The second move is to propose a representation to news audiences of a full range of options to allow them to respond to conflicts. And these should be debated as ideas, and that's my argument for what democracy would be about, rather than simply about policy decisions or party options, it should be about diverse

perspectives. Oliver Ramsbotham's typology of intervention is an example of this; it covers both forcible and non-forcible interventions, governmental and non-governmental, including media interventions. He also argues that knowledge should be discussed and questioned in terms of constituting a response than an event.

To conclude then, improving war reportage is fundamental in working towards the idea of peace. Linking into peace and democracy is clearly at the roots of this. Despite the present day proliferation of news media formats and texts and the apparent willingness to portray and represent the most difficult and painful experiences in human life, most often the realities, the horrors, but also the possibilities in wars and their underlying conflicts remain hidden from public sight and experience.

Jake Lynch:

I am going to try not repeat previous discussions and perhaps give a new perspective on peace journalism. The definition of peace journalism is that it is when editors and reporters make choices about what to report, how to report it, that create opportunities for society at large to consider and to value non-violent developmental responses to conflict. There are a number of key concepts here that were already mentioned. First of all, the notion that war and peace is perhaps a false dichotomy. What is at issue is how we respond to conflict, conflict is a fact of life, any two people with (what seem) incompatible goals tend to have a conflict. It is how they choose to respond to conflict that is at stake. Secondly, about choices, journalists report the facts but inevitably there are more facts than there are reports. So any act of reporting is also an act of suppression. We have to choose on some basis and it is the criteria used which again is at issue here. Opportunities for society at large to consider and to value non-violent developmental responses to conflict presupposes that members of that society are in a position to do something about it, once they have considered and perhaps been shown how they can value non-violent responses. There is a proposition build into that, namely that a society has some kind of public discussion taking place about how conflict will be responded to and that media representations have some bearing on that public discussion.

Why should we perceive peace journalism, why should we create these opportunities for society? The answer is contained in another statement about peace journalism: 'peace journalism makes audible and visible the subjugated aspects of reality'. This is by Johann Galtung, who is the person who first named it peace journalism.

Subjugated aspects of reality are containing an acceptance that there is within the news a system and a structure. There are more facts than reports, but the ones that are missed out are not by chance, they are not random, they represent a pattern of omission and a marginalization where some aspects of conflict are always pushed to the edge, subjugated. In other words, we are not merely reporting the facts; we're doing something to them. In representing them we are doing something to the facts and we have to take responsibility for that so we have to identify its consequences. Where we don't like the effects we have to devise ways to counter the effects of what we are doing to the facts.

This is a photo of my partner reporting from the big demonstrations in London (when the war in Iraq started), one of the 665 around the world, on February 15th 2003. At that time 56% of the British were against invading Iraq, only 29% in favor. But at time of the invasion, only six weeks later, 63% were in favor and 23% against. Now that six-week period is worth mentioning in our discussion. What happened in that period and how was it represented? Especially since support of the invasion rapidly fall away as the propaganda was exposed. Between April and September they didn't take any survey. But in September 2003 there was a survey and they changed the question to: 'do you now think that the war was justified or unjustified?' In retrospect, 50% said unjustified, 40% justified and the rest didn't know. This pattern remained ever since and that's also why they stopped the surveys because people clearly made up their minds. So that's a very interesting register of the effect. What does that mean? Propaganda was exposed and obviously the non-appearance of weapons of mass destruction mattered; perhaps the notion played that Iraq would be a land of milk and honey once Saddam was removed and peace would break out; perhaps the notion that there would be a dividend to global security as a result of the removing of Saddam. And all those propositions were exposed as untrue or became much more problematic. Swing voters very quickly swung back again and in a second survey they were against the invasion. So what do we do to the facts? Nico has already mentioned the importance of bipolar conflict formulations and I'll try to draw some connections from that. [Slide with cover of News Week] This is a frame, literally and also a reporting frame. News Week in common with many other media decided that this was a zero-sum game of two parties: if George gains a meter, Saddam must loose a meter. Any change in the relation between the two points must take place along that line; it means that ultimately each side is positioned towards the two alternatives - victory or defeat. Each side not wanting to lose will step up its efforts to win and will escalate the conflict. It's about the good-and-evil effect because if you want or need to escalate the

conflict then what you do is that you are inclined to construct the other not merely as the other but also as evil, as the devil's incarnation, as beyond the level of civilized behavior. The more evil you can make the enemy, the more justified you are in using extreme measures to defeat him. Johann Galtung calls this the DMA-syndrome: Dualism, Manichaeism, Armageddon, the last battle of good and evil. This demonisation, the propaganda that we're familiar with has a connection with the decisions made at the outset to framing it as consisting only of two parties. The question 'who will win' arises out of the framing and from that question arises the good and evil, they are flexible. Iraq was a democratic republic of evil formerly good and it is now good and formerly evil. Osama bin Laden is often being linked to Saddam Hussein - they are both enemies so they must be on the same side. There are only two sides, how does it make any sense that there are other possibilities? They must be linked because they're both against us. There were claims that the relations between Saddam and Al-Qaeda go back ten years.

There is a little book with guidelines that BBC-journalists carry around. It contains an attempt to define the role journalism should be playing in democracy. At one point it says that audiences must receive an intelligent account, which helps them to form their views. When they're talking about society considering and valuing non-violent responses as part of a debate or a discussion about how we respond to conflict, this is what the BBC says we should do. We must allow the arguments to be heard and tested, to enable the national and international debate. In my opinion you can only test something if you measure it against something else. You have to weigh facts before publishing them and to weigh them you need a counter-weight. Weighing and testing inevitably imply that where there is a proposition you need a counterproposition to juxtapose with it. Did that happen, was that tested? If you look at the proposition that says that regime change is the only way to remove the threat. I doubt it that was tested. Because thanks to Belgium, Germany, France, China and other countries there was an alternative, they said that the only way to avoid the threat is to prolong the inspection process. So there are two alternative propositions to be tested against each other. In both cases there were plenty of people pulling on the alternatives but not from traditional sources. So you could say that that was the journalist's responsibility: either you do without the perspectives you want and stick with the sources you've got or you move beyond those sources in search for the perspectives you want, otherwise you are guilty of allowing the arguments to pass without being tested. Likewise other propositions are that regime change is the only way to improve the humanitarian situation in Iraq and the only way to bring about

regime change is war. We are surrounded by transitional societies. There have been many regime changes, which have given on to some resemblance of democracy, which haven't involved a war: Eastern Europe, India and others. We did a study tracking the use of the word 'oil' in stories about the war showing that most mentions are in a historical context like the Oil for Food program or to the price of oil fluctuations after the invasion. There are some articles saying that some people think the war is all about oil, and that is it, they don't explore any further; there is no strategy to take hold of that issue and to raise a discussion.

Against who is the war in Iraq? In one sense it is against other rivals who want control over the access of essential and strategic resources. China and India are expanding economically; the European Union is expanding politically. Pre-empting coalitions among other countries was of crucial importance for the US. The US wanted to deter them from thinking that they could rival the power of the US. That is a valid possibility, which I think may have been useful to juxtapose with the other propositions. Johann Galtung and others give the characteristics of peace and conflict journalism based on the understanding that we inhabit conflict and what's at stake in the way we respond to it to explore the conflict formation. The conflict arena was Iraq; the conflict formation had a much broader geographical and political space. In the official discourse, the propaganda, the cause of the war was to be found in the conflict arena. Saddam suppressed his own people and he threatened global security. These were the official causes of war. In order to connect with another possible cause of war we have to be prepared to look beyond the conflict arena to locate the causes and therefore the outcomes outside Iraq. There is an alternative to relate the causes of the war outside Iraq, to make the war more transparent. Take an example with football. You have two teams, two goals and one ball. The thing is to see who's winning. If you add a third team, a third goal and a second ball then we usually don't know who's winning. But we stop thinking about the type of war and we play the catch the pray game. In other words we don't automatically think who will win. The proposition is not about winning or loosing. The proposition is ensuring collective security, the basis on which we share access to resources. Those questions move a little closer to the frame.

When this Norwegian professor said that Norway is involved in the war maybe against the international law, significance is that we don't necessarily have to cover that story but that it was an interesting opportunity to open up the debate about the oil issue.

Lord Brown, CEO of BP, publicly complained about the British strategic oil companies that are not playing on a level playfield, in

what was already a joggling in preferment in terms of oil and reconstruction contracts after the end of the war. They were warning Blair that he had to lobby for a bigger piece of the cake for the UK. There were views that we might have passed the peak of the oil age where newly discovered resources are not replenishing protective usage. About 20% of the population in the UK thought that the war was all about oil. Tony Blair made a speech then explaining that the war is not all about oil, he was drawn into that issue, again an opportunity to explore that issue. Journalists had the opportunity to test the arguments and enable the debate, but sadly they didn't.

War propaganda is encoded in the narrative arc of the Hollywood western and many people decode it using that narrative arc, that we're under threat of bad guys, the good guys have to stick together. Militarily, Britain is not significant part of the war effort but politically it is crucial. If Britain (the main ally) had not joined in, nobody would have. Bush got the war because Blair joined in, Blair joined in because he won a parliamentary vote, he only won because of a shifting public opinion, and the shifting public opinion was due to misrepresentation in the media. In a sense British media sent us to war.

There were many claims against the invasion that were disproved in the media way before the invasion. Crucial counterpropositions against the war were totally ignored. Another interesting quote, of Gandhi: 'I object the violence because when it appears to be good, the good is only temporary and the evil that is done is permanent'. The argument is: has the invasion brought democracy back and can it therefore justify the war?

There are two arguments for peace journalism. First of all, from the Galtung table, the causes to a conflict can be found anywhere in time and space, that is part of the body of knowledge about conflict that is brought up by practitioners and theorists in conflict analysis and peace research. The media representation of conflict fails to match what we know about conflict, it is unethical in a way. The other argument is to give peace a chance, when we take Gandhi's dictum into account and the fact that war appeared to be warn out in Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, that it has done more bad than good, that should be taken into account to all the discussions on the merit of violent responses to conflict. We should be aware of the consequences of previous conflicts when we're making decisions about the next one. On the day after the results of the Iraqi election were announced in the London press, of all the newspapers, only the Financial Times drew our attention to the fact that the main

policy position of the UIA [United Iraqi Alliance], the winning party, was already traded away.

George Terzis:

My presentation will be based on a research project that I did four years ago and which has been updated couple of times. In this research project I wanted to find out why journalists report conflicts the way they do, the reasons they give for doing their job this way. We focused on the Greek and Turkish press. It was during a crisis time between the two countries. We did an analysis and we found more or less the same as in the other conflicts - the dichotomy, the propaganda. For a number of media it was a Don Quichote syndrome, 'I' (the journalist) 'am not to blame, it is the system. I would have done a better job but I am under peer pressure and sources pressure', etcetera. The model I use for analyzing the data is an adaptation of Brian McNair's from his book Sociology of Journalism.


Figure 4: Adapted from McNair 1981

He puts the professional culture and the organizational culture in the center and then he puts different elements around them. We try to cluster the reflections of the journalists based on this diagram.

As I said at the center, the main focus is on the professional culture. A number of Greek and Turkish journalists referred to the BBC and said that they didn't have an official code of ethics as the BBC has. They will say that there is no code of ethics for them or that there is a code but that is not been obeyed. 'There is no fair competition; if my colleague will go for the story, I will have to go for the story'.

At the same time they blamed the aesthetic codes: whether can you actually do this type of peace journalism when we have only 60 seconds of pictures. There are certain aesthetic conventions.

Greek and Turkish Journalists also feel like soldiers of the national army more than as journalists during times of crises. 'In our training schools we learn how to be good war reporters but there's little training for other type of journalisms. Within war reporting we never heard about peace journalism. This is what we know; we know how to become good war reporters.'

Furthermore, in number of cases journalists would be fired in Greece and in Turkey, more in Turkey at that time, if they go against the perceived national interest. Even today legislation exists in Turkey that if as a journalist you speak against the 'national interest', you can be imprisoned. In Greece you will be fired if you go against certain interests and you will not be able to find a job afterwards, because of the media concentration that exists. There are basically three main media conglomerates and if there is critique on national interests, there is kind of an agreement among them not to employ such people. In order to give you an example, I would like to refer to the Greek–Macedonian conflict. There were two demonstrations of one million people in Athens and Thessaloniki demonstrating against Macedonia being called *Macedonia*. Obviously the Greek state was behind it, (you didn't even have to go to work so you could go to the demonstrations.) You can imagine what kind of mobilization was behind these demonstrations. One journalist, only one, dared to write: who the fuck was Alexander the Great? He was a butcher who killed a lot of people in a brutal way and destroyed civilizations all the way from here to India. He started telling the different story. As a consequence he couldn't write for about two years using his own name. The peer pressure was such that he couldn't even talk to friends and other journalists because nobody dares to go against two million people who are marching … In that sense journalist unions, that could raise different opinions or that could protect journalists, are not there in Greece and Turkey.

Moreover, a lot of journalists referred to the organizational constraints, mainly deadline pressures. Some journalists will even say that these (the deadlines) are manipulated by politicians and

other official sources and that's purposely done, not leaving time to allow double-checking and inclusion of other opinions.

'When my competitor gets the story, how can I miss the story? I know it's one-sided and I know it might not be true and I don't have the time to check the sources. 'The officials' are such efficient sources and usually you don't have the time to try to find other sources.'

And they added: We tend to forget that this type of [international affairs] reporting depends heavily on the official sources. The kind of dependency that we have on the ministries of defense and foreign affairs is much greater than for example the environmental correspondent, because he can depend on personal experiences and eyewitnesses.

There are also the interlocking interests of media owners and politicians. Both in Greece and Turkey there is a law that forbids media organizations to participate in public tenders but in both countries media owners do. They even participate in defense tenders, so there is a direct link between making money out of the army and the media.

There is also economic pressure. In Greece and Turkey there was a savage regulation of the media, there was no regulation at all. Regulation was following the events, instead of being the other way around. This meant that there were so many media that the market could not support them. As a consequence there is not enough money to have decently paid staff.

There were three more important observations coming out from this study. First the journalists were talking about the peer pressure. 'Every minister and the president has their own lobby of journalists so you want to be inside of this lobby, not be isolated from the main sources. You get a favorable treatment, you also socialize with them, and you know them very well. You are not only doing your job but you also work with friends, you don't want to be 'the bad guy' in the group.' They face huge peer pressure especially in times of crises, not to be different, not to voice other opinions.

Another thing is that every morning you have to read all the newspapers, or at least three or four newspapers; you need to know what your competitors are doing. So everything that is reflected as mainstream tends to be reproduced and exaggerated. 'When 60% of the media is in favor of the war we tend to think that 60% of the population is in favor of the war because that's what we read all day.'

Finally, the journalists were talking about the fact that media elites are part of the elites of the country, the political, economic and managerial elites and they socialize with each other. During times of crises these elites tend to call each other and to communicate very well; they set the standards that need to be established, the favors that need to be exchanged, they set the rules that need to be set.

So the pressures are even higher during those times. That is what we called the spiral of crisis. The mainstream war and panic speech tends to exaggerate and that is what we found out during the Greek-Turkish crisis. You could see that also during the Iraqi war: Fox news was right-wing anyway and when CNN became more nationalistic and right-wing, the Fox news had to exaggerate and move further to the right.


Spiral of 'crisis/moral panic' speech		Spiral of silence (for resolution/stability oriented reporting)
1-6 Levels of Media Cultures of Crisis	peer pressure	1-6 Levels of Media Cultures of Crisis

Figure 5: Modes of Reporting During Times of Crisis

At the same time, people with different, moderate voices tend to silence themselves - a negative spiral, moderate voices becoming less and less powerful.

I would like to conclude with some of the questions that came up at the end of the study:

> Who defines peace? We are talking about peace journalism, but what is a solution and what is peace? How do you define peace and war, since in every peace there is sense of war and in every war there is peace. Who defines the goals? How do local actors and journalists understand these discourses? How do journalists decide about the type of audience that the issues should address? How journalists can be hold accountable? Should the peace journalism 'intervention' take place in the first place?

These were the journalists' questions. We considered them to be very important when trying to establish a media culture of stability and peace.

Jean-Paul Marthoz:

I do not come from the peace journalist perspective, I come from the human rights reporting perspective where sometimes there are links with peace journalism and sometimes not. Human rights issues have been often hijacked in the last years in order to promote war, to justify major interventions. This was the case for example in Iraq, where all the other arguments were exhausted. The US called upon the right for regime change for the population to justify its intervention. The US used the same reports of my organization that they refused a few years ago when they were still shaking the hands of Saddam. This puts Human Rights organizations in a very delicate position. My thesis is that in the last years the capacity of journalists to withstand the pressures of the government has decreased. There have been waves in the history of the relations between media and power. Vietnam was sort of a model of independence for journalists. This is what I call the NSC effect, the National Security Council Effect, which is more powerful than the CNN effect. The CNN effect (which might also be called a BBC effect) is the capacity of the media (especially the broadcast media) to shape and force government to take actions, sometimes against their own interest. I quote an interesting sentence: 'The world is for purpose of intelligence reduced to a village; all men are compelled to think of all things at the same time on imperfect information and with too little time for reflection.' This sentence is not about the CNN effect but about the telegraph effect; it was pronounced in 1889, it is an old notion that the rapidity of new technologies forces government to take wrong actions and forces journalists to do their job not properly. It is true that in the 1990s when the Cold War ended, there was a moment when journalists felt that they had more autonomy to act independently from government. They were not sort of squeezed into this binary relation of being patriotic or unpatriotic. So it is true that for a couple of years the notion that the media were able to independently frame issues and shape policies had some relevance. Let's take for example the Ethiopian famine in 1984. Famine relief is considered to have been pushed by the BBC. The media has a major role in forcing governments to intervene. Take for example what happened in Kurdish areas in Iraq after the First Gulf War. Simply the presence of the cameras was one element in the decision of the allied forces to intervene. The absence of the cameras contributed to the absence of an intervention on behalf of the Shiite Muslims in the South. Interesting to see is that when a similar kind of oppression (of these two minorities) occurred at the same time, the absence or presence of the media shaped the reaction by the US and UK. My impression is that already in the 1990s the capacity of

the media to shape governments' political actions was already an illusion. It was rather easy to force the international community to intervene when the intervention was about helping the sick and the wounded and the victims by providing humanitarian assistance. It was nearly impossible, even through intense media coverage, to force governments to intervene to stop war or genocide. If we take the case of Rwanda, all the information and images were there in the early days of 1994 and it was impossible to stimulate the international community into taking - what we would consider as a Human Rights organization - their responsibility. A few months later, when you had the images of the refugees in Goma, it led to an international intervention. But it was purely humanitarian because it was much more understandable and acceptable for people to send just food and medicine instead of sending troops. The big change in the media-state relationship on the international scene was 9/11. Again we turned back to the 'good old days' of the Cold War, there was again a binary rationale provided by the media. The media had to define themselves as being in favor of democracy or in favor of terrorism; it has reduced the capacity of the media to influence policies and also of non-governmental organizations as mine. We were considered as news wholesaler, in the sense of providing information to journalists at the wholesaler level. It has become much more difficult to break through the media system because of the new framework that has been imposed by the war on terror, which in itself seems to have become an equally intense ideological framework as the Cold War used to be.

Within that context I would like to give a few other frames that characterize and effect war (on terror) reporting. There is a growing determination by large states in a context of increased competitive media representations, the ascendancy of 24-hour televisions, the rise of the Internet, a context of increased media competition. It's a battle of symbols and ideas, like a clash of civilizations. The government wants to shape media and restrict coverage, especially in times of war. In the battle between the military and the journalists, the military have won the battle. Governments want to decrease official access to information. Governments want to use methods of propaganda and create an atmosphere where independent journalism is less and less feasible and less acceptable. You see the noise machine that was created in the US before the war in order to stigmatize dissent. It is kind of the philosophy of 'it's my way or the highway', you have to follow me or you get out. This determination of states to influence the coverage has a major influence of journalism and also of non-governmental organization reporting, we certainly feel the pressure. This capacity of states to influence media coverage is increased by the characteristics of the media themselves - the increasing commercialization of news leads

to a subservience to the perceived public opinion, shaped by official communication policies. The concern shifts more towards news distribution and presentation and away from newsgathering, contents and context. There is certainly a diminishing capacity for autonomous journalistic reporting leading to a non-investigative journalism. The other pattern that helps governments to use part of its power to shape media is the reduction of journalism to journalism of proximity. This leads media to be focused on what is close to the core readership or viewership, which creates an atmosphere in journalism where propaganda can flourish. The same goes for the difficulty of journalism to integrate complexity in the coverage. This is one of the great difficulties in the war against terrorism.

There is also the issue of the focus on breaking news and the ignorance of processes that might lead to conflict and war. Wars are processes. There is a lack of early warning journalism. The Darfur crisis started in March 2003, peaked between September and December 2003, and the first big broadcast came in March 2004. The other issue (what I call the 'red zones') is the growing safety risk of covering war as an independent journalist.

I think that NGOs have a growing role as information wholesalers and are becoming interpreters of situations and events. This form of proxy journalism is chipping away at the autonomy of journalism. The media themselves are forced to move into this new media sphere. They are forced to move because the public has taken new usage patterns. My final consideration in the coverage of conflict deals with the definition of objectivity versus the journalism of attachment. It is the question of committed journalism when for example crimes against humanity have been committed. Does the mission of journalism have a moral pattern? Does it exist to make a difference? Should it take sides?

Eran Fraenkel:

My presentation is quite different. I am focusing on a series of activities conducted by a NGO (Search for Common Ground) in a country – Macedonia - which has a very specific social, political, and informational context. The first question I am asking myself is whether it is possible to create pro-social media organizations in the commercial environment. I am talking about a type of media that is reporting on the country and society where the reporters come from. It is a situation where they are reporting about themselves. When we are talking about the reporting of war and conflict or preventive journalism, we are looking at the use of media as a tool for preventing the escalation of conflict to war in the country where the

journalists themselves come from, rather than reporting on outside countries. This is about Macedonian reporters reporting on Macedonia and Macedonian society.

In 1991 when Macedonia finally declared its independence it inherited the social ideology of self-segregation. All the communities could focus on what was the formation of a new state and how each community could get as big a slice of the pie as possible. The biggest slice of the pie meant that Macedonia's constituent communities fought for their right to have things the way they were before – i.e., in former Yugoslavia. Each community saw the media as the representation of its own ethno-national interest. From this perspective, the purpose of the media is not to tell 'you' about 'me,' but to tell me about me and what is of interest to me.

Between 1995 and 1999 Search for Common Ground in Macedonia organized within the existing media team-reporting projects in which we had reporters from various communities who worked for existing media, looked at issues through a shared lens, as opposed to separate lenses. They were trying to identify which were common problems in society that affected everyone. They were looking for common solutions to these problems that would benefit everyone. They avoided focusing on: 'what is there that affects me', 'how it affects me' and 'how can I improve my condition irrespective of how it affects you'.

Here, I want to focus more on the war in Kosovo in 1999 and the way it affected Yugoslavia. When the war in Kosovo started it was a very interesting thing to watch as far as this conversation is concerned. Milosevic started forcing Albanians out. If you didn't look at it carefully, it would have appeared that the migration patterns were random, but they weren't. What happened is that certain Kosovo Albanians ended up in Macedonia, rather than in Albania. I think this was deliberate. In my opinion Milosevic realized that there were as many difference between Albanians in Kosovo and in Macedonia as there were similarities. Once they actually had to coexist and cohabit, they would have to face their internal differences, which they were not compelled to do as long as Kosovo Albanians stayed in Kosovo. The international community didn't understand this. Within a few months Macedonia had 400,000 refugees from Kosovo. That is equivalent to about 25% of the Macedonian population.

In response, the international community decided that Macedonia needed new media to serve the refugees. Let me explain the significance of this decision. I look at this issue in terms of information circles. In Macedonia there is a 'Macedonian language

information circle', which is intended primarily to serve the country's ethnic Macedonian majority population. Albanians, Macedonia's 2nd largest community, generally are able to penetrate this circle because minorities tend of know the language of the majority. Macedonian speakers, however, are generally unable to penetrate the 'Albanian information circle' because they lack knowledge of the language.

As result of the Kosovo War, the international community introduced a third circle; namely, the 'refugee population information circle,' which was predominately in Albanian. Rather than using the existing domestic media in Macedonia, given that no one knew how long the refugees would remain, the international community spent an enormous amount of money trying to set up newspapers, a television station and radio stations to serve the refugees. As a consequence, the two already barely overlapping information circles found themselves excluded from the third circle of information. The refugees had no idea of what was going on in Macedonia and had no idea how the Macedonians and others in the country perceived them; what was to be expected of them; what was going on outside the camps; what the Macedonian government was thinking; etc. Likewise, people in Macedonia had no idea what was going on within the refugee community. The upshot was the international community isolating the refugees from the domestic population and the domestic population from the refugees.

In response to this situation, Search for Common Ground initiated a project to bridge these non-intersecting information circles. It consisted of inviting thinkers, writers, and intellectuals from the ethnic Macedonian, the Macedonian-Albanian and the refugee population in the creation of a series of publications called Refugees in Macedonia. They wrote on issues that, in their opinion, affected members of all three information circles. In other words, it was a public forum between the refugees and the rest of the Macedonian population. The publications appeared in both Macedonian and Albanian and were distributed free of charge throughout the country and throughout all the refugee camps. Refugees in Macedonia became the only source of information that the country had on what was going on in the camps. The series continued for a year, even though the war lasted only three months. Although after three months most of the refugees had returned to Kosovo, many issues between the populations of Kosovo and Macedonia remained. There were on-going issues on what was happening in Kosovo that needed to be communicated between the two geographical areas. That eventually evolved into a new publication called Karavan. Karavan was the successor to the refugee's magazine and is a six-country publication covering and distributed throughout much of SE Europe.

The question is: What does this have to do with peace journalism? It is not a term that I use. What we do talk about, however, is inclusive journalism; or preventive journalism. We don't work on newsgathering although I think that the daily news conditions people's immediate responses to events. What we are trying to do with our work is to condition people's expectations of what is important and how they should think about of what is going on. We hope that through our efforts, when an event does occur the people of Macedonia will temper their immediate response and try to understand it as part of a process, in a broader context.

Right now I would like to show a video we produced in Macedonia on the war in Kosovo. In Macedonia all communities tended to respond to the war as though they had been victimized by it. Not only that, but as though each had been the sole victim of the war. It was almost seen as a competition: Who was the greatest victim? We selected five communities whose perspectives on the war we saw as being distinct from the others: Ethnic Macedonians from different parts of the country; Albanians who had hosted refugees as opposed to those who had not; the Roma; and Albanian Kosovo refugees. The purpose of Search's project was to illustrate that there is no single true point of view. We wanted to facilitate the recognition among all Macedonians that each community had experienced the war differently, and that all these perspectives were equally valid. Macedonia's communities needed to be recognized and validate the experience of the 'Other' in order to avoid accusations that lead to the escalation of conflict and to violence.

((film))

Discussion

Nico Carpentier:

One of the main issues I would like to include in the discussion is the difference between theory and practice and how everything we have been saying about the analysis and different approaches and critiques, how it can be incorporated (or not) in journalistic practice.

Ides Debruyne:

The fist thing I thought about is how to convince journalists and media organizations to invest in these novel approaches?

Flip Voets:

What I missed is, even if there is overkill in information coming from official sources, that there are a lot of individual actions of journalists. I would like to give an example of a journalist from a Belgian TV station that went on his own to Iraq, risking his life. He brought very critical reports on TV, within the first week of the war. It is just an example to show that lots of journalists have tried to cover the war from different perspectives, also from the perspective of the victims. A lot of journalists are aware that they have to find alternative information. But especially when a crisis breaks out you have to have a closer look at what is happening in a redaction. There is so much information coming in; it is like a bulldozer of news coming. Everybody is trying to do his or her best. There is of course the element of competition. Everyone is trying to be the first and there is no time to be looking for second sources and so. The question I have is how we can make it easier for journalists to get access to that alternative news. The solution in my opinion will have to come also from the outside of the media, there will have to be more sources which journalists can use.

Evita Neefs:

First of all I must admit that most of the things I have heard are completely new to me and I am a bit overwhelmed. Especially the notion of peace journalism was completely new to me. I don't know whether I understand it completely, but if it is what I think that it is I am not sure that I agree that that is something that we ought to use. The exposé that was most close to me was the one dealing with the constraints of the job that we are doing. But it surprises me that there was only one brief mention of the role of the Internet. And then I think that Jake is especially harsh for the British media, when he says that it was the British media that sent us to war. I would rephrase it: they couldn't keep Britain from the war.

Jake Lynch:

First of all I would like to admit that that is harsh. I must say it has quickly improved; the propaganda was exposed quickly in this war, quicker than in previous wars and the media made much bigger impact. The Independent has done a lot to practice peace journalism in the UK. One very interesting thing about the Tsunami in December 2004 is that it dominated world coverage. There was constant reporting on the number of deaths caused by the disaster - 100,000; 150,000; 200,000... Half way through January the UN published a report giving an estimate of the number of people who die everyday as a result of lack of access to food, water, and

medicine. Just the children were at 11,000 a day. The difference between the two is that the one is an event and the other is a process. So seizing that as an opportunity to draw the attention to a process and making an implicit comparison between the event and the process was peace journalism. It is kind of an entrepreneurial approach to take opportunities to work on issues.

Eran Fraenkel:

What I think we didn't talk about is that every piece of information represents somebody's interest in giving and getting information. The fact is that the governments or the military, which are the most obvious candidates to give you information, do this for a particular reason. There are always people who benefit from conflict and they don't want to see that changed. I think that we have to look at where the common interests and outcomes are - whether getting information and acting on it - rather than just what the information is, or where it comes from.

Ides Debruyne:

Would you define peace journalism as an investigative journalism?

Jake Lynch:

In certain occasions: yes.

Ides Debruyne:

I think that there might be some confusion. My question is: should it be called peace journalism or simply good journalism? I don't think that people in the newsrooms are thinking that they are doing peace journalism. They were simply doing a better job. And I think that sometimes journalists are afraid of those kinds of qualifications of journalism. I think that there is a risk of over-exposure of the word peace journalism. It might be seen for many as too ideological. So this is a question of vocabulary as well.

Rune Ottosen:

There is evidence that there are interferences aiming to stop critical journalism within this conjuncture. For me it is not big deal to call it peace journalism in itself. As a provocation to start a discussion is a very good point. Why is it that the word 'war correspondent' has some glorious masculine connotation? Why should not (just in theory) be the word 'peace correspondent' as valuable? But it isn't. Why is the word peace perceived as some radical thing and isn't war

even more 'radical'? Peace journalism is a mean to make the options available to the public. If you are not conscious about these mechanisms that we have discussed, you really are willingly or unwillingly distributing war propaganda. Because the propaganda is present there, it's a movement. You have mentioned it; it is like a bulldozer. So if you don't relate to that and show the public that this is not plain information but this is a part of a campaign, if you don't give an opportunity to disclose that campaign itself, I don't think you are doing your job as a critical journalist. Another interesting point is that the period prior to the conflict is as important and even more important than the war coverage itself. Propaganda campaigns are launched before the actual war breaks out.

George Terzis:

I think that it is also important to pay attention to the people who perceive that they don't benefit from conflict resolutions. What I for instance could see for example during the period before the referendum in Cyprus and the rejection of the UN plan, was that the Greek Cypriots were saying: ' 'Why would we risk what we already have? It might not be 100% of what we want but it might be 80%.' Their agenda was to maintain what they perceived as secure benefits. That is a different agenda for moving forward.

A second point that I would like to make is that this discussion on media, war and peace reminded me of one of the first lectures I had in my university (while doing my Bachelor's). We had a course on media ethics. The professor discussed the difference between the ontological and teleological. The ontological approaches to journalism are the ones who follow the Kantian approach, which is 'this is *true*, and what we have to give the society, no matter what the consequences are'. And the teleological approach is the one where we examine what will be the outcome, the consequences of what we do.

I think that a lot of journalists today take the ontological/Kantian approach.

Eran Fraenkel:

I still ask whether the role of media is to inform or to educate and where the balance is between informing and educating the audience the media is addressing. I think that if you don't educate people, information doesn't get processed particularly well. But then, you can't educate everybody about everything. The world is extremely complex and things are happening all the time, so we have incredible amounts of information. The second point is that (going

back to the point of my presentation) just talking about journalism in general seems to be a bit too broad. We are talking about local as opposed to international media. Again, we have to ask ourselves who are the audiences and why. We were looking at the war in Macedonia in 2001: the way the international media were reporting and the way domestic Macedonian media were reacting to the international reports on the war that was going on outside their windows. The local media do influence the international media and how they perceive an event about which they don't know very much. The international media then can affect the local conflict, because people read the foreign press or listen to the radio - and believe the information they get. Often they flee from an 'unsafe area' because if it is described as such on the radio, it must be true. I think that there is a spiral, as George presented, but with different layers and actors in that spiral. You can't aggregate the local and international media into one. But I think that you really have to look at the connections and how they influence each other.

Jake Lynch:

As Eran says: everybody in a conflict that provides information is part of that conflict. It may be based on assumptions about that information and its provision will affect other opinions. Those assumptions can only be based on experience. It is because – take for instance the British governments' dossiers - we accepted the one on Afghanistan, that we got the war in Iraq. We're looking at a feedback loop of cause and effect. In touching them in passing, those sidesteps - Umberto Eco (as Mireille quoted) - were actually taking place when people receive information. There is a discernable effect based on the assumptions people make – about what will happen - when people receive information. You don't have to falsify reception (or opinions based on reception) in order to discern the effect of conditions of production.

On the name of peace journalism, people tend to be uncomfortable naming it peace journalism if they are comfortable with the notion that everything we do is already theorized. In Britain in particular, we have the Queen to tell us that we are more comfortable with practice than theory. People in Britain are doing a variety of things, and they think of themselves as just doing it. They don't realize that they already have got a theory about it, in order to do it. Whereas in other cultures, like in Indonesia for example, the leading newspaper Kompas has consciously, openly and explicitly adopted peace journalism as a method for reporting conflicts. That is, to a certain extent in their self-interest. The conflict of Muslims against Christians in certain areas, and being a newspaper traditionally associated with Christians, you have to have some strategy, which

you can point to. So they were quite happy to embrace peace journalism. But more generally, people doing a whole variety of things in Indonesia are more willing to except that there is no all-encompassing theory.

On the question how change might come about. Change might come about by having networks. It might be aided by having networks and giving journalists the opportunities to think through what they are doing. I also think it might come about because of anomalies. This follows the line of argument of Thomas Kuhn, in his The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. In brief, the habit of basing reports on official sources is a safety measure. It insulates journalists against criticism. They don't need to agree with what the prime minister says; they do it because it is the prime minister. It is as simple as that. But there is some further risk on the other side of the case, because of the non-appearance of the weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. This was the subject of so many claims, and such categorical claims from the same sources. Now the audience has been alerted of the danger of relying on those sources. There is a risk on the other side of the equation that was not there before. This is an anomaly, possibly leading to a paradigm shift. Another example would be the voting controversy in the United States, the same happened on another account on John Kerry's war effort. Again, balance in a story is something journalists use to insulate them against the allegation of taking one side against the other. It's an anti-risk measure. The claims on Kerry turned out to be completely without foundation, but nevertheless it got into the media by way of balance. It was a false obligation to balance. But the risk to the other side of that particular equation is there as well. So the existing war journalism paradigm is confronted with these anomalies, and that may be a sign that a transition is on-going.

Nico Carpentier:

I have one question about that. Don't you risk, instead of seeing social change coming out of those anomalies, that the anomalies produce cynicism from the part of journalists? Maybe speaking a bit from a Belgian context, 'well, we can't trust the state, sure, we know'. And then the journalistic routines protect you from entering to far into the dilemma. You're just thrown back, and just use the principle of balance.

Jake Lynch:

This is what the editor of the Sunday Telegraph said. He said: 'we felt duped, and if you feel duped, you become cynical.' So that is

one response. Another response would be to fashion yourself new routines.

Jean-Paul Marthoz:

I think that when we are discussing quality journalism and how to increase the capacity of the media to cover the world in a way, which would not be contributing to war propaganda, quite an interesting discussion is taking place in the USA. There is a real dualization in their media sphere and it is showing in these caricatures in the US. During the months preceding the war and during the war itself you really had a media segment that - I think - knew that they were basing their coverage on the violation of the basic rules of journalism. I mean: limiting dissent in terms of getting and finding other sources, playing the patriotic game … They knew basically what they had to do. There were media that were practicing that kind of journalism. When you read those media now, you'll see that much of the information was incorrect. It was already denounced as incorrect by quite a few magazines in the US, such as The Nation, The American Prospect.

So how do we do to reach journalists who are working for newspapers or Fox news or whatever, and that know that they base their success on violating the basic principles of ethical journalism? How do we do that? I can find a space for improving journalism, and I think the question of peace journalism is interesting, not necessarily because we should call it peace journalism, but because it forces journalists to think about why they are covering war that way. It provides a pedagogy to practice a better kind of journalism.

But how do we reach those people whose work is based on violating all the basic rules. Unfortunately, when we look at the evolution of the public, I am reading a book now, which is called Tuned Out. It is about how people under 40 are completely fed up with the news and don't tune in to the news and don't read the news. What do we do with those people, because we can work with the media but at the same time we're facing a huge part of the population that switches channels immediately when they see the news, when it is serious and well made. It's a matter of media literacy, which should be developed much more, in order to improve the capacity of citizens to understand how the information is being manipulated … Well, it doesn't have to deal with manipulation alone, but also with the mechanisms that make the news. Media literacy is something that would at the end of the day help to improve the quality of journalism. Because it would provide those media that base their strategy on quality (and attempted quality) with a viewership or a readership which will understand the rules. Now many people don't

understand the rules of journalism. They will confuse David Letterman with Seymour Hersh. There is a total confusion and blurring of lines who is a journalist and who is not.

Rune Ottosen:

The argument raised about the Internet is very important and we haven't discussed it enough. It brings up the question that you have brought up: 'What to do?' Of course, blogging is a possibility. To give an example: during the war in Iraq one of my previous students put on his own blog criticizing the media on a daily bases. A lot of journalists read that and it has had the effect that the language issues for example were discussed on that blog. Should we call them 'occupation forces', should we call them 'resistance forces'. All this kind of interesting issues … If you take that out of the newsroom and put it in a blog, available for public discussion, it is not an internal discussion anymore. Of course, you have in the USA a lot of NGOs working like that. For instance FAIR (Fairness and Accuracy In Reporting) criticizing the media. When they criticized the New York Times they felt obliged to reply. You have similar organizations in Britain as well I believe. Internet gives a lot of possibilities to alternative agendas.

Mireille Thornton:

One example of audience participation I would like to mention is the two sides system, where two boxes are placed next to each other on the BBC-website in response to the conflict. One of the sides was titled something like 'what can we do about it - here are ideas for you?' and the other was 'what can we do about it - your responses?', where people could put their ideas. That was full of lots of different ideas and well-informed opinions. And then on the BBC's opinion part, which is about 'what can people do', all there was, was a list of organizations where you could send money to. No reference even to writing to your MP, which is a very established way of expressing your opinion. I think that there is an opportunity there that might be explored more.

Flip Voets:

I just wanted to say something about the Internet. It can be a means of alternative sources. Like during the war in Iraq when Salem Pax had his own blog and provided an alternatives source for the Iraqi point of view and population, which we never heard before. We need to try to find solutions, not just for so-called quality newspapers. What do you do with media that are sometimes very commercial, or with the small media, which do not have the means

to employ investigative journalists? I still think we have to try to find solutions that enable journalists to have access to alternative sources of information, and not just the official ones. In times of crisis they are so strong and journalists don't even have the time to check them. It is only after everything has already happened, that the war has already started, that they sometimes become critical and realize that they have participated in propaganda.

Nico Carpentier:

One question: what about source reliability? You mentioned alternative sources, which I would say is vital. There are a lot of these alternative sources out there, but they are not considered to be reliable. Quite often this is just simply because they are NGOs or civil society organizations. There is this problem in some cases of knowing about them (that is problem 1), but also learning to trust them, or finding ways to find out whether they are reliable or not.

Flip Voets:

I think that that's a question for the NGOs- to organize themselves more than is the case now, to provide journalists with information and to counter disinformation.

Eran Fraenkel:

Just to respond to the last point. During both the wars in Macedonia (the Kosovo war in 1999 and the Macedonian war in 2001), I've been working for many, many years in Macedonia and know a good deal about it. And yet when we made ourselves available to international journalists – offering them another point of view on Macedonia an alternative - we were ignored completely. We went out and put copies of magazines, business cards, in all the hotels where journalists were staying, in press briefing rooms, on and on, trying to find people to talk to us. Nobody did; not one.

My reaction to the Internet is that I'm afraid that there is more and more information but less and less knowledge. You can get lots of information, but again, how do you process it? How do you know what it means? The source might be reliable but you might not know how to interpret what you're reading. It is vast and there is so much of it! It is yet another bulldozer. There were people in the States who knew what happened in some village in Macedonia before I did - living down the road - because someone sent them an email.

Also in terms of how this is processed, a colleague at the BBC, who is an East-European analyst, said that the BBC had 25 analysts on staff, and now they have 2 or 3. Even the reliable sources - even the BBC - are providing more and more information and less analysis that turns the information into knowledge.

The question about journalism ethics and regulations is the same question that people ask of NGOs: 'Who are you accountable to?' You are accountable to yourself; it is a self-regulating process. Ethically you're accountable to the communities you serve. Legally, the people that you're accountable to are your funders. Or to the courts if you're engaging in libel, or something else which is in breach of the law. Otherwise … Fox News is thriving, and who thinks that Fox is providing us with accurate and reliable information, let alone knowledge?

Ultimately the question is: as a media consumer, why do I need to have this information? Why do I need to care about this particular place or event? So I don't know about the Darfur. So what? So I don't know the famine in Ethiopia. So what? There are hundreds of thousands of people dying in Congo. As long as the rubber companies get the rubber to make the tires for the car I drive, I don't care about Congo. Why do I need to care?' These are clearly exaggerated examples – but not too exaggerated. What worries me is that media don't recognize that they don't just 'reflect reality' but they create our reality. People only care about those things they know about. Someone is deciding for us what we should know about - and hence what we should care about.

Jake Lynch:

I would like to go back to the question about the sources, which I think to be essential. There are two issues that need to be taken into consideration when talking about this. One conceptual and one practical. The conceptual one is how do you model the conflict. In your model of conflict quite often conflict is used as a synonym for 'violence' in media coverage. If you think that conflict is the same as violence you miss the rest of the conflict and therefore you might also miss the whole range of activities done by people to work on the conflict, which are essential part of the picture. If you aim is to give an accurate account on what is really going on, then if you don't have that understanding of conflict, your account is inaccurate, because it doesn't match what you have known that is been observed in that conflict. It is as being a science correspondent reporting that the Earth is flat.

The practical issue is how you work in it. When we give workshops to journalists about what we call 'corner-turns', for instance: if the extremists were setting out to end all contact between the different communities in Macedonia, then according to whatever group they would be wrong. Eran Fraenkel said, on the same issue: blah blah. That's a corner-turn. From the top line of the conflict to another approach. Or like: as security was tightened on the streets of Skopje, parents were queuing into Macedonia's big kindergartens to drop off their children. So it is like: how do you turn the corner from the top lines to your alternative source. It is what we call a framework of understanding. A general belongs in the story about conflict, you don't need to explain why the general is relevant, that a convention. Where you do need a framework in which the relevance of the kindergarten can be appreciated.

Just lastly, on the issue of reliability, I think the score has evened up, recently. I am afraid, on the Iraq weapons the official sources were dead wrong and the alternative sources were dead right, but we can't go back; the fall has taken place. You can't mend an egg that has been broken.

Ides Debruyne:

It was something about criticizing the media. I am just asking myself, isn't that also a job for academics to criticize the media more often.

Nico Carpentier:

We'll never do enough. But there are - at least in the Belgian case - a couple of people that once in a while publish material and make the analysis. But that is indeed not that much; I would like to see more of it. But you do know the traditional story and the traditional explanation: we have quite a lot of other responsibilities. At the risk of becoming very cynical … But in the Belgian case there are at least a couple of academics that try. That definitely happens not enough and we still need more. Maybe George also wants to react to this question.

George Terzis:

To go back to the conventions again, first of all you do belong to a system of criticism because you teach and you research those events [the media coverage of the Greek-Turkish conflict for example] but what is the convention inside the universities?

For example in Greece, universities and society are actually separated. I studied at the Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, which is the biggest in the country (120.000 students, 10% of the city's population) and the university is still separate from the society. This means that professors are involved in research, are looking for European funds, and publish in academic journals. A lot of my colleagues publish in academic journals, but an activity like this workshop would not be commonplace in Greece.

Evita Neefs:

I just want to invite all those Belgian academics that publish on the media into the newsroom. I completely agree, that we should reflect on our jobs, on what we do and that we can always be more critical. But a lot of those critiques, and I'm talking about mostly the Flemish situation, are formulated by people who have never seen the inside of a newsroom. So please come to visit us and look at the constraints.

If I just may come back to the terminology, because I think words are important. In September 2002, I have published the first story on the possible other reasons for the war against Iraq. A bit later, I wrote a very lengthy piece with the title 'How the media made this war inevitable'. We talked about articles written by academics from Chicago and Harvard explaining exactly how Saddam wasn't a threat anymore. After 9/11, for instance, we immediately pointed at – even with the high casualty rate - that in Africa children were dying from Aids in much greater numbers. Even heart attacks and car accidents were generating more casualties. But I would not all this being called peace journalism, not because peace has some hippy meaning, but because the term peace journalism in my mind means that *I have to do something*. I'm doing this because it is good journalism. That is a much better term than peace journalism. I feel very uncomfortable with that term. For me there is a difference between what you call a peace and a war journalist, because a war journalist is on the battlefield and is just saying what is happening: so many rounds of bullets, so many rockets, so many casualties. Where as a good journalists start from months in advance, looking what leads up to this war …

Flip Voets:

I've just a small comment to make. I agree with what has been said about the dialogue between the academic world and the press, it is very important. I think that the criticism should not be published only in the academic journals but also in small articles in the press itself. It is important to participate in this dialogue in the press itself,

and the press is willing to learn to accept those discussions on what is good journalism. We should keep in mind that not many people will read the thick reports but they will read a short article with the core ideas of what you found in your research.

Nico Carpentier:

I would like to thank all of you for this stimulating discussion and for the very interesting presentations. Thanks for being here, it was a pleasure hosting you and I hope we can do this again some other place, some other time, but hopefully not because of another war. Thank you.

http://www.kubrussel.ac.be
http://www.vub.ac.be/VECO
http://www.fondspascaldecroos.org/

Workshop participants:

Nico Carpentier
Ides Debruyne
Eran Fraenkel
Jake Lynch
Jean-Paul Marthoz
Evita Neefs
Rune Ottosen
George Terzis
Mireille Thornton
Flip Voets